By the close of 2022, the first compliance reports under the US Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act had begun to trickle in, offering a preliminary glimpse into how importers—particularly in the apparel and textile sectors—are responding to one of the most stringent supply chain due-diligence mandates in recent memory. The UFLPA, which came into force in June 2022, shifted the burden of proof squarely onto importers. Any goods suspected of links to forced labor in Xinjiang, particularly cotton and related derivatives, are presumed ineligible for entry unless clear and convincing evidence is provided to the contrary. This reversal of traditional assumptions has, not unexpectedly, sent ripples through global sourcing strategies.
What makes the UFLPA distinct, and arguably more challenging than prior measures, is its operational rigor. The Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has not only detained shipments at a steady pace—its open detention data suggests hundreds of consignments flagged in the second half of 2022 alone—but has also made clear that documentation must go far beyond general supplier declarations. That open detention dataset, while still incomplete in parts and not always updated with predictable regularity, offers invaluable signals for compliance teams trying to discern patterns in enforcement. In fact, it has quickly become something of an anchor for those seeking to refine their buyer-supplier audit models.
For apparel and textile brands navigating this new landscape, the immediate priority has often been to retool existing audit frameworks. Some have sought to overlay CBP’s detention data onto their own sourcing records, looking for common denominators—whether specific ports, forwarders, or even particular ginners and mills appear disproportionately in detained shipments. But this process, while conceptually straightforward, is often messier in practice. Discrepancies between internal data granularity and the level of detail in CBP’s public releases mean that drawing firm conclusions is not always possible on first pass. Some compliance officers have reported spending considerable time reconciling these datasets, manually at times, in order to spot trends that can inform future audit scope.
Another complexity lies in mapping Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers, particularly ginners, where transactional documentation is thinner and relationships more fragmented. In many cases, importers have historically focused their attention on Tier 1 suppliers—the garment makers or fabric mills with whom they have direct contracts. But under the UFLPA, this is no longer sufficient. The expectation, whether explicitly stated or not, is that importers will exercise due diligence several steps upstream. This has led many firms to initiate or enhance their processes for collecting affidavits or certifications not only from direct suppliers but also from the ginners handling raw cotton. And while templates for such affidavits vary, certain common elements have begun to emerge across the sector.
A workable starting point for firms setting up an affidavit collection system might look something like this. First, importers should request a formal declaration from each Tier 2 ginner, attesting that the cotton processed did not originate from Xinjiang. This declaration, ideally, should include supporting records—purchase invoices for raw cotton, transport documents, and where possible, geolocation data or transaction certificates that tie the cotton back to non-Xinjiang sources. Second, importers might consider requiring the ginner to provide contact information for its raw cotton suppliers, allowing for spot verification or further documentary review. Third, a signed acknowledgment that the ginner is aware of the UFLPA’s provisions and penalties, and that the declaration is made under penalty of perjury where applicable, lends additional weight to the affidavit.
Yet even as firms build out these processes, there remains a certain degree of ambiguity as to what constitutes “clear and convincing evidence” in CBP’s eyes. The agency has published guidance, yes, but much of the practical interpretation is still being shaped case by case through enforcement. This leaves compliance teams in the uncomfortable position of needing to anticipate regulatory expectations that are, by their nature, still evolving. Some have responded by erring on the side of over-documentation. Others are adopting a phased approach, focusing first on high-risk shipments and expanding documentation efforts as internal systems mature.
Interestingly, the role of technology in managing these new requirements is still uneven across the sector. Larger brands, particularly those with vertically integrated operations or longstanding traceability investments, are generally better positioned to link CBP’s detention data with internal audit trails. Some have begun to build dashboards that combine external enforcement data, supplier declarations, and shipping records into a single view, enabling quicker identification of risk points. Smaller firms, by contrast, often rely on external consultants or audit providers to bridge these gaps, at least in the near term.
The knock-on effects on sourcing strategies should not be underestimated. Anecdotally, some brands have already shifted portions of their cotton sourcing out of regions that, while not covered by the UFLPA presumption, nonetheless pose verification challenges. Others are revisiting long-established supplier relationships, driven less by direct evidence of risk and more by an abundance of caution—or, perhaps, by a sense that reputational risk now outweighs traditional cost considerations. The full impact of these shifts will take time to play out, of course, but there is little doubt that the UFLPA’s first compliance reports mark just the start of what promises to be a prolonged period of supply-chain recalibration.